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Direct income payments (DIP) are in the centre of the discussion in the ongoing political 
debate whether agricultural policy objectives can be pursued in an economically more 
efficient and, at the same time, less distorting way. However, the review of literature and 
agricultural policy debates on DIP suggests that the numerous different issues addressed by 
DIP often reveal that a systematic approach to the topic is still missing. Particularly 
conflicting policy objectives lead to confusion and can conceal the real merits of DIP. 
The most important objectives of agricultural policies as expressed by governments are 
income support or income stability for farmers, structural adjustment in rural areas, regional 
assistance and payments for the provision of public goods (such as landscape preservation and 
wildlife habitat). These objectives reflect two categories of policy targets: (1) the overcoming 
of market failures and (2) equity or income distribution related interventions. Both can be 
addressed by DIP. 
This paper discusses under which circumstances DIP are an appropriate and efficient measure 
to address the objectives of agricultural policies. It identifies and examines the characteristics 
and features that DIP should have in the context of different objectives. The development of 
an objective-directed decision tree for the design and efficient use of DIP as an instrument in 
agricultural policies aims at facilitating a sustainable and resource saving economic policy in 
the field of agriculture. With the intervention decision tree for DIP the paper provides an 
important tool to structure and improve policy debates and policy decisions on DIP. 
 
2. Policy effects of direct income payments – the decoupling issue 
DIP for agriculture cover all payments made directly from public authorities’ budgets to 
individual farmers or farms and have the effect of increasing farmers’ current incomes. They 
are either made to meet particular (agri-) social demands or to remunerate farmers for the 
provision of non-commodity outputs for which markets do not exist (FELLMANN, 2006). 
This category of measures excludes budget payments that are intended to increase the income 
possibilities in the future (e.g. earmarked investment contributions). However, it may include 
measures that are linked to production to varying degrees, and measures under which farmers 
are expected to comply with particular conditions, engage in specific activities or provide 
specific non-agricultural outputs (OECD, 1994; FELLMANN, 2006).  
DIP measures are often referred to as “decoupled” policies - in a sense of having no link to 
production (and consumption) and therefore being neutral to production and trade. CAHILL 
(1997) defines a policy as fully decoupled if it does not distort decision making by farmers 
and if markets adjust as if there was no policy in place. In a less restrictive sense, a policy is 
defined to be effectively decoupled if production decisions by farmers are affected by the 
policy in a way that does not increase the level of production; i.e. the policy results in a level 
of production that does not exceed the level that would exist without the policy. 
In practice, it is very difficult to completely eliminate the link between a payment (or policy) 
and the production decision process. There are three main mechanisms through which policies 
affect production and trade. First, static effects or relative price effects arise when incentive 
prices are affected, markets work imperfectly or farmers make decisions under binding 
constraints. Second, risk related effects either result from a policy induced reduction of 
variability of income (insurance effect) or from the fact that more wealthy farmers take bigger 
risks (wealth effect). Third, dynamic effects may occur when current investment decisions 
and/or farmers’ expectations on future policies affect production decisions in the following 
years (HENNESSY, 1998; OECD, 2001a). 
Since it seems difficult to imagine any agricultural policy measure for which none of these 
effects exist and also because it is difficult to evaluate ex-ante whether a policy is indeed 
decoupled or not, two conclusions can be drawn with regard to decoupling (CAHILL, 1997): 
(1) Whether a programme is production and trade neutral can only be determined on the basis 
of an empirical ex post analysis of farmers’ response to that programme. (2) In general, 
decoupling is rather a question of degree than a zero-one characteristic. DIP usually are 
viewed as being advantageous compared to traditional agricultural policy measures due to 
their higher level of decoupling. However, also DIP may be linked to mandatory production 
activities and thus possible production incentives and market impacts have to be reviewed 
carefully. 
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3. Intervention decision tree for direct income payments 
The intervention decision tree in Figure 1 provides a general framework for the policy design 
of DIP. This decision tree indicates the design of DIP and its changes with regard to 
production incentives. Its structure is mainly based on the criterion whether the DIP requires 
mandatory cultivation/production or not; it therefore distinguishes between production 
related, production neutral and production unrelated DIP. 
Figure 1  Intervention decision tree for direct income payments 
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Source: FELLMANN, 2006 
The first step of a DIP policy design is to determine whether the policy objective requires 
production activities. While this is usually not the case when the objective targets income 
distribution, particularly market failure related DIP may to some extent be linked to physical 
units of production or production activities. If a policy is production unrelated (DIP-III-C in 
Figure 1) the decision tree indicates that such DIP can be disbursed on the basis of the farm or 
the individual (DIP-IV-D and DIP-IV-E). If a production link is necessary or desired (DIP-II-
A) the policy design may be based on production related or production neutral DIP (DIP-III-
A and DIP-III-B). Production neutral DIP are disbursed independently from the production of 
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agricultural products and their quantity (DIP-IV-C). Production related DIP depend on the 
production of a specific product and/or its quantity (DIP-IV-A and DIP-IV-B). 
It is the objective of a policy that is decisive for the design of the DIP and thus for its 
production effects. If a policy objective requires production links, the policy design will come 
out less decoupled and the more production incentives result. In Figure 1 the degree of 
decoupling in the most disaggregated level of DIP (DIP-IV) increases from the left (quantity 
related DIP) to the right (person related DIP). To avoid unnecessary market distortions, a DIP 
of the category DIP-III-C requiring no production activity should be chosen whenever the 
rationale of a DIP is purely directed to interpersonal income redistribution. DIP aiming at the 
provision of a public good or service might require some kind of production or activity. In this 
case, a production neutral DIP (DIP-III-B) is preferable compared to a less decoupled 
production related DIP (DIP-III-A). 
The desired characteristics and features of DIP in the context of these two policy objectives, 
income distribution related interventions and the overcoming of market failures, will be 
exemplified in the following. As an example for DIP in the context of objectives concerned 
with distributional issues the case of adjustment assistance will be discussed. In the context of 
objectives related to the correction of market failure, direct payments for the provision of 
environmental goods and services will be analysed. 
 
4. Direct income payments for adjustment assistance (compensation payments) 
Past agricultural assistance has attracted more resources into agriculture than would have been 
the case without agricultural policies. Also production techniques and farm size are affected. 
It can be argued, that farmers made their economic decisions relying upon policy continuity, 
i.e. in line with the expectation of further policy assistance. DIP may be used as a measure of 
income redistribution to help these farmers to adjust to policy changes that could not be 
foreseen but affect their incomes negatively. 
DIP which are introduced to compensate policy changes do not require production activities 
(DIP-II-B in Figure 1); thus they should not be conditional on any other requirement, but a 
fixed historical basis to be used for calculating the DIP to be paid to farmers. Any further 
condition requiring recipients to continue farming or to keep resources in farming in order to 
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preserve their eligibility, would hinder smooth adjustment. Provided that the compensation 
payment is not linked to agricultural production or activities, this results in a high degree of 
decoupling (DIP-III-C in Figure 1). 
In general, DIP measures should be clearly linked to a specific policy objective and not be 
mixed up with others. Compensation payments which aim at tiding over the adjustment 
pressures resulting from a policy change and the non-fulfilment of past policy promises, 
should be designed according to a clearly-defined transitional period; i.e. such DIP cannot be 
made permanent since their distortion potential would increase and lead to a slow down of 
structural change. If, in addition, payments of unspecified duration are linked to farm area 
(DIP-IV-C in Figure 1) or to the agricultural holding (DIP-IV-D) rather than to persons (DIP-
IV-E), there is a risk that they become capitalised into farm asset prices. This leads to a 
reduction of the economic value of DIP for the farm and may also constrain structural change 
in agriculture. 
Also, a decline of payments over time seems desirable as a feature of the policy design of 
compensation payments. Declining DIP are justified, if farmers adjust their farming practices 
over time, thereby reducing the need for further payments. This presumption is valid for both, 
unprofitable farms and farms with growth potential. SWINBANK and TANGERMANN 
(2004) furthermore propose that legally binding commitments for future payments should be 
made in the form of a certificate issued to each recipient, stating the future stream of annual 
payments. Such certificates should be tradable like government bonds. This would create 
more flexibility for the individual recipient leading to a smoother adjustment to the new 
policy environment. 
 
5. Direct income payments for the provision of environmental goods and services 
Agricultural activities often create additional joint or spill-over – multifunctional - benefits, 
such as open space, wildlife habitat, biodiversity, cultural heritage, flood prevention, an 
assured supply of food and viable rural communities. To promote such multifunctional 
benefits DIP are used as a supportive measure when market forces alone do not result in an 
economically optimal structure of production and consumption. In these cases, a market-
determined output level may be inefficient because of unpaid external costs or uncompensated 
external benefits (OECD, 2001b). 
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While adjustment payments as outlined above should not be conditional on any current 
production or activity requirement, DIP in the context of objectives related to the correction of 
market failure often require some kind of agricultural production or activity and thus their 
degree of decoupling is lower (DIP-II-A in Figure 1). All DIP for the provision of 
environmental goods and services might therefore have an effect on production and trade and 
create economic distortions. If possible a DIP policy in this field should be designed 
production neutral and thus independent of product and quantity (DIP-IV-C in Figure 1). An 
example would be the landscape preservation if cultivation is the only requirement. The same 
objective could be targeted by a more restrictive and thus more distorting policy when the DIP 
require a certain type of production (e.g. pastures) or are even dependent on the amount of the 
produce (e.g. number of suckler cows). In both cases this would lead to production related 
DIP (DIP-IV-A and DIP-V-B in Figure 1) with a high potential to distort market outcomes. 
To keep such distortions as low as possible and to ensure that DIP for the provision of 
environmental goods do not become a disguised form of agricultural production support, 
policy makers should consider the following recommendations with regard to DIP policy 
design (OECD, 1994; WICKE, 1993; BUCKWELL at al., 1997; HAMPICKE, 1991; OECD, 
2001b; RANDALL, 2002):  
1.  DIP for the provision of environmental goods and services should remunerate farmers for 
clearly defined environmental goods or services for which markets do not exist. 
2.  DIP should not be in conflict with the polluter-pays-principle, i.e. polluters have to bear 
the full costs of their pollution. Through legally defined environmental standards farmers 
can be obliged to avoid environmental damage without receiving any payment or 
compensation for income losses. Thus, DIP would normally not be used as an incentive to 
reduce or eliminate negative externalities. 
3.  DIP should not be linked to the production of an agricultural commodity or the use of 
inputs, so that they do not encourage a higher output. 
4.  The size of the payment should relate to the full cost of producing the targeted 
environmental good; e.g. the costs of cultivating and safe-guarding the birds breeding 
habitat. Another approach would be to calculate the opportunity costs incurred to provide 
the environmental good. 
5.  DIP should be made on a recurrent contractual basis. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
If governments want to meet their policy objectives (particularly those relating to non-
commodity outputs or multifunctionality) by the use of DIP in an efficient way, a precise 
definition of the objective is crucial. An optimal policy design achieves a specific objective 
while keeping the impact on economic distortions low and ensuring efficiency in the 
allocation of resources. The decision tree for DIP facilitates the policy design for a sustainable 
and resource saving economic policy in the field of agriculture. In doing so, the intervention 
decision tree for DIP provides a helpful and important tool for researchers and politicians to 
structure the policy debate and policy decisions on DIP. 
Economic theory provides two rationales for government intervention: correction of market 
failures and income redistribution. While government intervention in the case of market 
failures is generally done for reasons of economic efficiency, intervention in order to 
redistribute incomes between groups in the society is basically done for reasons of equity. 
DIP can be used to address both types of objectives, but have to be adapted carefully 
depending on the specific targets. If used as a measure to compensate income losses due to 
policy changes, DIP provided as declining compensation payments over a clearly defined 
period could not only help farmers to adjust to policy changes, but also release budget funds 
when efficiency increases. Such gains could then be used in and tied to areas that are known 
to be crucial but currently lack resources due to budget restrictions – e.g. the provision of 
environmental goods and services. It must be stressed, though, that in order to reduce resource 
inefficiencies it is generally important to limit overall expenditures to the minimum required 
to achieve the well-defined agricultural policy objectives. 
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